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yy> BRIEF 
gg LAW OFFICES OF Q ^ f A l A ^ 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
364 -5 EAST 3 I O O S O U T H 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8-4109 
(801) 4-85-8123 
March 22, 1990 
Jeoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Jensen v. DeLand 
No. 870107 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
This letter is written in response to the Courtfs invitation 
of March 8, 1990 to reply to the Petition for Rehearing filed by 
the State in the above-captioned case. Because this response is 
extremely succinct Appellant requests that this letter be 
circulated among the justices of this Court in lieu of a formally 
bound reply as is normally contemplated for the average length 
response. 
Appellant concurs with the State that the present system does 
not provide an adequate opportunity to raise ineffective counsel 
in the lower court during the appellate proceedings. This 
reaction causes a defendant in a criminal case to essentially rely 
upon a habeas corpus evidentiary hearing many months or years 
later to litigate the claim. Such a method is a great detriment 
to an incarcerated defendant as well as to the availability of 
evidence concerning the conduct of counsel which during the habeas 
corpus proceedings could have occurred years before. 
Appellant's counsel believes that this issue as to a means of 
solving the present problem deserves careful attention either by 
granting a rehearing in the instant case to allow the parties to 
find various options available to this Court or to request that 
the rules committee formulate a new procedure for this Court and 
the Court of Appeals. Special concern should be directed to those 
cases in which counsel represents the defendant both at trial and 
on appeal since the ability to raise ineffectiveness of counsel is 
naturally virtually eliminated in such cases. Appellant would 
therefore be pleased to reopen this case for the express purpose 
of determining a procedure to solve problems such as this one for 
future cases. 
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It is assumed that Appellant in this case will be entitled to 
a hearing based upon the original opinion of this Court as to his 
claim of ineffective counsel either in a habeas corpus setting or 
in an evidentiary setting as now being proposed. Appellant wishes 
to insure that his rights to a full hearing will not be 
compromised by any new procedure which is developed by this Court 
pursuant to the Statefs request. In addition, Appellant in his 
own Petition for Rehearing has requested that the scope of the 
issues to be examined in an evidentiary hearing be expanded to 
include the question of prosecutional misconduct. This argument 
is set forth in Appellantfs own Petition for Rehearing. 
Appellant also disagrees with one statement contained in the 
Petition for Rehearing filed by the State. The State likens the 
defendant in the Hafen case to that of the instant defendant. 
The State makes the following assertion: 
Here, defendant knew of the ineffectiveness issues 
and requested his appellate counsel to raise them on 
appeal. As in Hafen, Defendant's appellate counsel 
did not honor his request. Defendant remained silent as 
did Hafen. No "unusual circumstances" exist in the 
present case beyond those found insufficient in Hafen 
to preclude application of the procedural waiver rule. 
State's Petition for Rehearing, p. 6. 
This statement is in error for two reasons. First, in Hafen 
the defendant's attorney on appeal was the same attorney who 
represented him in trial. In the instant case two separate 
attorneys were appointed. Second, and most importantly, the 
instant defendant did not remain silent as to his appellate 
counsel's failure to raise issues but in fact wrote several 
letters of concern and requested an affidavit from his appellate 
counsel stating these concerns. It is hard to imagine what other 
actions an incarcerated defendant could take if he was not 
satisfied with the appeal being written by his newly appointed 
appellate counsel. 
Finally, the question as to the voluntary waiver raised by 
the State in its Petition for Rehearing (pp. 6-7) again requires 
extensive analysis since what is just and proper in one type of 
case would not be in another. For example, it is unfair to expect 
a criminal defendant to be able to ascertain his counsel's 
ineffectiveness especially if that counsel has represented him in 
both the trial and the appeal. In that context a defendant may 
well not be aware that he is waiving any claim of ineffectiveness 
until a post-conviction proceeding in which new counsel has been 
appointed. These are matters which should be addressed in 
resolving the entire complex problem now existing. 
In summary, Appellant's counsel will fully cooperate with 
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this Court in any inquiry which it deems relevant to the State's 
proposed solution to the ineffective counsel problem since such 
solution will ultimately effect numerous defendants each year. On 
the other hand, however, Appellant is entitled to a speedy and 
expeditious proceeding in one form or the other as to his claim 
that he has been illegally incarcerated. For this reason, 
therefore, regardless of the outcome of the procedural inquiry 
requested by the State Appellant should be allowed to have an 
immediate hearing so that his particular case does not further 
languish. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Craig S (J Cook 
Attorney for Appellant 
CSC:kd 
cc: Dan R. Larsen 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Richard L. Jensen 
P. 0. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84070 
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